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In probabilistic transition systems, behavioural metrics provide a more fine-grained and stable measure of
system equivalence than crisp notions of bisimilarity. They correlate strongly to quantitative probabilistic
logics, and in fact the distance induced by a probabilistic modal logic taking values in the real unit interval
has been shown to coincide with behavioural distance. For probabilistic systems, probabilistic modal logic
thus plays an analogous role to that of Hennessy-Milner logic on classical labelled transition systems. In the
quantitative setting, invariance of modal logic under bisimilarity becomes non-expansivity of formula evalua-
tion w.r.t. behavioural distance. In the present paper, we provide a characterization of the expressive power of
probabilistic modal logic based on this observation:We prove a probabilistic analogue of the classical van Ben-
them theorem, which states that modal logic is precisely the bisimulation-invariant fragment of first-order
logic. Specifically, we show that quantitative probabilistic modal logic lies dense in the bisimulation-invariant
fragment, in the indicated sense of non-expansive formula evaluation, of quantitative probabilistic first-order
logic; more precisely, bisimulation-invariant first-order formulas are approximable by modal formulas of
bounded rank.
For a description logic perspective on the same result, see [46].
1 INTRODUCTION
Probabilistic transition systems, or partial Markov chains, serve as a quantitative model of con-
current systems (see [18] for an overview of probabilistic models of concurrency). Probabilistic
systems can be compared under standard two-valued (crisp) notions of bisimilarity [25, 4] under
which two states are either bisimilar or not, but it has been observed previously [17] that in many
respects, quantitative measures of process equivalence are more suitable in this setting: Probabilis-
tic systems may, e.g., differ slightly in the values of individual probabilities or contain mutually
deviating but very unlikely transitions, and in such cases one would like to have the possibility of
saying that two processes are almost the same, or in fact quantifying their degree of distinctness.
This has motivated the introduction of behavioural metrics measuring the behavioural distance be-
tween states in probabilistic systems [17, 10, 42, 12, 2, 6]. More precisely, these distance functions
are pseudometrics, i.e. distinct states can have distance zero, namely if they are exactly bisimilar.
From the outset, both crisp probabilistic bisimilarity and behavioural metrics have been related
to suitable modal logics. Larsen and Skou [25] introduce a modal logic featuring modalities ^p ,
with ^pϕ read ‘with probability at least p, the state reached in the next step will satisfy ϕ’. This
logic thus has a two-valued semantics, and we refer to it as crisp probabilistic modal logic. It is easy
to see that this logic is bisimulation-invariant, i.e. if two states are probabilistically bisimilar then
they satisfy the same modal formulas; Larsen and Skou show that the converse holds as well under
additional assumptions on the underlying systems, which amounts to a probabilistic Hennessy-
Milner theorem. In the more fine-grained setting of behavioural metrics, bisimulation invariance
becomes non-expansivity w.r.t. behavioural distance – to see the connection, consider crisp bisim-
ilarity as a {0, 1}-valued discrete behavioural distance and observe that in this view, a map from
the state space into a set {0, 1} of crisp truth values is bisimulation-invariant iff it is non-expansive
w.r.t. this distance. Van Breugel and Worrell [42] introduce a behavioural (pseudo-)metric on prob-
abilistic transition systems (generalizing previous work), along with a quantitative probabilistic
modal logic taking values in the unit interval (closely related to logics previously introduced by
Kozen [24] and Desharnais et al. [10]) whose key feature is a modality taking expected truth val-
ues. This logic, a fragment of the probabilistic µ-calculus [8, 21], is bisimulation-invariant in the
mentioned sense, i.e. non-expansive w.r.t. behavioural distance. Moreover, the pseudometric on
states induced by the logic in fact coincides (up to a constant factor) with the behavioural metric,
a quantitative version of the Hennessy-Milner theorem.
Classically, i.e. for modal logics of relational structures, one has a second converse to bisim-
ulation invariance of modal logic besides the Hennessy-Milner theorem: The van Benthem the-
orem [37] asserts that every bisimulation-invariant first-order property is in fact expressible in
modal logic – i.e. modal logic is as expressive as it can be, given that it embeds into first-order logic
and is bisimulation-invariant. This result can be viewed as saying that modal logic provides effec-
tive syntax for bisimulation-invariant first-order properties – something that first-order logic itself
does not, as it is undecidable whether a given first-order formula is bisimulation-invariant [30].
Our main result in the present paper is a corresponding expressive completeness result for quan-
titative probabilistic modal logic. Before we discuss the statement of this result in more detail, we
recall two earlier results for logics that are related, in orthogonal dimensions, to our target logic:
• The only currently known expressive completeness result for crisp probabilistic modal logic
states that every bisimulation-invariant property expressible in a natural variant of (crisp)
probabilistic first-order logic is expressible in crisp probabilistic modal logic extended with
infinite conjunction (hence also infinite disjunction) by a formula of bounded modal rank.
(This is an instance of a general result established in coalgebraic logic [33, 27, 34].)
• A recently established expressive completeness result for a simple quantitative logic, fuzzy
modal logic with Zadeh semantics of the propositional connectives, states that every prop-
erty that is bisimulation-invariant in the sense of being non-expansive w.r.t. the natural
notion of behavioural distance and moreover expressible in fuzzy first-order logic can be
approximated by formulas in fuzzy modal logic of bounded modal rank [45].
One sees an apparent analogy between infinite conjunctions and approximation. The bound on
the rank is essential in two senses: First, without it, the statement becomes, in both cases, morally a
direct consequence of the much simpler Hennessy-Milner theorem, and then in fact applies to arbi-
trary bisimulation-invariant properties rather than only first-order definable ones. This is already
true in the case of relational labelled transition systems: By the standard Hennessy-Milner theorem,
every bisimulation-invariant property, first-order definable or not, is definable in Hennessy-Milner
logic with infinite conjunction. (This follows simply from the fact that a bisimulation-invariant
property is a union of bisimilarity equivalence classes, and by the Hennessy-Milner theorem each
such class can be described by the infinite conjunction of all modal formulas satisfied by the states
in the class.) An analogous statement holds for crisp probabilistic modal logic (by Larsen and
Skou’s probabilistic variant of the Hennessy-Milner theorem [25]); for quantitative probabilistic
modal logic, van Breugel and Worrell [42] similarly show that every bisimulation-invariant prop-
erty in the metric sense can be approximated by modal formulas, again as a direct consequence
of their quantitative analogue of the Hennessy-Milner theorem. Second, in the classical case of
labelled transition systems (or Kripke models), the bound on the rank is actually the core of the
van Benthem theorem: Once one knows that every bisimulation-invariant first-order definable
property is definable by a modal formula with infinite conjunction but of bounded rank, the actual
van Benthem theorem, i.e. definability by a finitary modal formula, is immediate since (under the
standard assumption that the modal language has only finitely many atoms, which is w.l.o.g. and
made in all existing proofs of the theorem) there are, up to logical equivalence, only finitely many
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formulas of a given bounded rank. Summing up, the bound on the rank is the key part of the van
Benthem theorem.
Correspondingly, our main result, i.e. the announced expressive completeness result for quanti-
tative probabilistic modal logic, states that
every bisimulation-invariant property that is definable in quantitative probabilistic
first-order logic is approximable by quantitative probabilistic modal formulas of
bounded rank.
Again, bisimulation invariance is to be understood in the sense of non-expansiveness w.r.t. be-
havioural distance. Quantitative probabilistic first-order logic is a natural first-order extension of
quantitative probabilistic modal logic that we introduce here; its syntax and semantics are mod-
elled on coalgebraic predicate logic [27] and ultimately Chang’s modal predicate logic [7], but we
replace the original two-valued notion of satisfaction with a quantitative notion. Simultaneously,
quantitative probabilistic modal logic can be seen as a quantitative variant of Halpern’s (crisp)
type-1 (or statistical) probabilistic first-order logic [19].
Technically, we base our proof on a strategy put forward by Otto [29] and used in many recent
van-Benthem type results (including [34, 45]): One shows using a suitable notion of Ehrenfeucht-
Fraïssé equivalence that every bisimulation-invariant first-order property is local, i.e. depends only
on a bounded neighbourhood under an adapted notion of Gaifman distance, then concludes by an
unravelling construction that the target property is in fact invariant under bounded-depth bisim-
ilarity, and finally shows that all such invariant properties are approximable by modal formulas
of bounded depth. Unlike in the classical case, where the statement that all properties that are
invariant under k-bounded bisimulation are definable by a modal formula of modal rank k is next
to trivial, the last step is in fact the key part of this programme in the quantitative setting, and
presumably of independent interest. In particular, modal approximability in bounded rank holds
for bounded-depth bisimulation-invariant properties irrespective of their first-order definability, a
statement that certainly cannot be improved to on-the-nose modal definability.
Besides newly introduced notions of Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé equivalence and Gaifman distance on
probabilistic transition systems, the key tool in the proof is a notion of up-to-ϵ bisimulation game
for probabilistic transition systems. The pseudometric induced by this game coincides with logical
distance and (hence) with behavioural distance in the sense of van Breugel and Worrell [42]. The
proof of this equivalence is based on Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality (see also [2, 41, 39]); essen-
tially, the logical distance relates to Kantorovich distance, and the game distance to Wasserstein
distance, and Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality guarantees that these distances are equal. Our games
differ substantially both from the bisimulation games up to ϵ previously considered by Desharnais
et al. [12] and from the much simpler games used by Wild et al. [45] for the case of fuzzy rela-
tional systems in several respects; in particular, in our game the allowed deviation ϵ changes in
the course of a play. Also, the behavioural distance induced by our games is incomparable to that
induced by that of Desharnais et al. (who already show that their distance is incomparable to van
Breugel and Worrell’s [12, Examples 7 and 8], and relates more closely to logical distances induced
by crisp probabilistic modal logics).
The material is organized as follows. We introduce the relevant logics in Section 2; that is, we
recall the definition of quantitative probabilistic modal logic and newly introduce its first-order ex-
tension. In Section 3, we introduce various notions of behavioural distance, including our notion
of bisimulation game up to ϵ as well as Kantorovich andWasserstein distances, both based on fixed
point definitions. As indicated above, the key stepping stone towards our probabilistic van Ben-
them theorem is the result that all properties that are invariant under bounded depth bisimulation
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are approximable by modal formulas of bounded rank, proved using Kantorovich-Rubinstein dual-
ity in Section 4.We introduce our notion of Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé equivalence and Gaifman distance
and subsequently prove locality of bisimulation-invariant quantitative probabilistic first-order for-
mulas in Section 5. Finally, we prove our main result, the van Benthem theorem for quantitative
probabilistic modal logic, in Section 6.
Related Work. Our work owes much to Wild et al.’s recent formulation and proof of a van Ben-
them theorem for fuzzy modal logic as cited above [45]. This result is set in a much simpler frame-
work where the logic is interpreted over fuzzy relational models, which differ from classical la-
belled transition systems by assigning truth degrees in [0, 1] to propositions and transitions but
unlike probabilistic models do not impose restrictions on the sum of truth degrees. Also, modal-
ities are interpreted in the fuzzy setting by just taking infima and suprema, respectively, rather
than expected truth values as in (quantitative) probabilistic modal logic. Summing up, quantita-
tive probabilistic modal logic is semantically more complex than fuzzy modal logic in a) involving
real arithmetic as opposed to just lattice operations, and b) consequently not allowing for a sep-
arate treatment of successors, precisely because it involves summation over sets of successors.
Technically, this is reflected mainly in the more complicated structure of behavioural metrics and
bisimulation games; in particular, unlike in the fuzzy relational case we need to include a Wasser-
stein formulation of behavioural distance.
As shown by Rosen [31], the classical van Benthem theorem holds also over finite structures;
although we use a proof strategy that covers the finite case in the classical setting, we currently
leave open the question whether our main result remains true over finite probabilistic transition
systems (essentially, constructions that produce finite structures in the classical case become infi-
nite in the presence of infinitely many truth values).
For two-valued logic, van-Benthem-type theorems, also known as modal characterization theo-
rems, abound, having been established e.g. for logics with frame conditions [9], neighbourhood
logic [20], fragments of XPath [36, 15, 1], modal µ-calculi (within monadic second order log-
ics) [22, 14], PDL (within weak chain logic) [5], modal first-order logics [38, 35] (within first-order
correspondence languages), and two-dimensional modal logics with an S5-modality [44] (within
S5 modal first-order logic). We are not aware of previous modal characterization theorems in the
quantitative setting other than the mentioned work on the fuzzy case [45].
We have already mentioned work on behavioural distance in probabilistic systems [17, 10, 42,
12, 2, 6]; concretely, the Kantorovich-style discount-free notion of behavioural distance that we
use here goes back to work by van Breugel et al. [40].
Our probabilistic Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games (but not our bisimulation games) are related to
corresponding games introduced byMakowski and Ziegler in the context of topological first-order
logic [28] as well as to probabilistic bisimulation games used by Desharnais et al. [12], in that
they include rounds where sets of states are played in intermediate configurations, with the main
difference being that our games involve fuzzy subsets, rather than crisp ones as in the cited work.
2 QUANTITATIVE PROBABILISTIC LOGICS
We proceed to introduce the logics featuring in our main result, quantitative probabilistic modal
logic and quantitative probabilistic first-order logic. Both logics are interpreted over probabilistic
transition systems, which we often refer to just as models. We allow for infinite transition systems
but, like existing work on quantitative probabilistic modal logic [42], restrict to discrete probability
distributions over successors at each state.
Explicitly, we fix a set At of (propositional) atoms; then a probabilistic transition system
A = (A, (pA)p ∈At, π
A)
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consists of a set A of states, a valuation map pA : A→ [0, 1] for every atom p, and a map πA : A×
A→ [0, 1] (we will write π instead of πA when the model is clear from the context) such that for
each a ∈ A, the map
πa : A→ [0, 1], πa(a
′) = π (a,a′)
is either zero or is a discrete probability measure on A, i.e.
∑
a′∈A
πa(a
′) ∈ {0, 1}
(implying in the latter case that the support {a′ ∈ A | πa(a
′) > 0} of πa is at most countable). We
call a state a terminating if
∑
a′∈A πa(a
′) = 0, and transient otherwise. At transient states, π thus
acts as a probabilistic transition relation. Whenever a model is designated by a calligraphic letter,
such asA, we will always implicitly assume that the corresponding roman letter, e.g.A, designates
the set of states.
Remark 2.1. The probabilistic transition systems that we define above can be seen as Markov
chains extended with propositional atoms and the possibility of termination. They deviate from
the ones considered in previous work on quantitative probabilistic modal logic [42] in three mostly
inessential ways: a) We consider only one probabilistic transition relation. This is purely in the
interest of readability; a generalization to several probabilistic transition relations indexed over
a set of actions amounts to no more than adding more indices. b) For the sake of generality, we
have added propositional atoms; the set of propositional atoms is a parameter of the setup, so the
model without atoms is a special case. c) Instead of using subdistributions over successor states, i.e.
requiring
∑
a′∈A πa(a
′) ≤ 1, we more specifically require either a distribution (total weight 1) or
termination (total weight 0) at each state. This is for technical convenience and clarity in presenting
the proofs, in particular the bisimulation game; minor technical modifications required to cover
also the model based on unrestricted subdistributions are summarized in Remark 6.6.
2.1 antitative Probabilistic Modal Logic
We next recall the syntax and semantics of quantitative probabilistic modal logic, following van
Breugel and Worrell [42]. Formulas ϕ,ψ , . . . of the logic are defined by the grammar
ϕ,ψ ::= c | p | ϕ ⊖ c | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ψ | ^ϕ
where c ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1], and p ∈ At ranges over propositional atoms. Maybe slightly deviating from
standard practice, we define the (modal) rank of a modal formula ϕ as the maximal nesting depth
of ^ and propositional atoms in ϕ; e.g. ^^p ∧^q has rank 3 (since p contributes 1 to the rank). We
denote the rank of a formula ϕ by rkϕ and the set of all formulas of rank at most n by Ln .
A formula ϕ evaluates to a probabilistic truth value
ϕ(a) ∈ [0, 1]
at a state a in a probabilistic transition systemA. Conjunction is interpreted by taking minima and
negation by taking complementary probability, while ⊖ is subtraction truncated at 0. The modal
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operator ^ takes expected truth values. Formally, we define ϕ(a) recursively by
c(a) = c
p(a) = pA(a)
(ϕ ⊖ c)(a) = max(ϕ(a) − c, 0)
(¬ϕ)(a) = 1 − ϕ(a)
(ϕ ∧ψ )(a) = min(ϕ(a),ψ (a))
(^ϕ)(a) =
∫
ϕ dπa .
Note that we generally use integral notation for readability, although given that all distributions
are discrete, these integrals are actually just infinite sums; e.g., in the above case,∫
ϕ dπa =
∑
a′∈A ϕ(a
′) · πa(a
′) =
∑
a′∈A ϕ(a
′) · π (a,a′)
is the expected truth value of ϕ for a random successor of a, distributed according to πa . We define
disjunction ∨ as the dual of ∧ as usual, so that ∨ takes maxima.
Remark 2.2. We note that the dual  of ^ defined by ϕ = ¬^¬ϕ differs from ^ only at termi-
nating states: For a terminating, we have (^ϕ)(a) = 0 for all ϕ and hence (ϕ)(a) = 1 for all ϕ,
while for a transient, we have
(ϕ)(a) = 1 −
∫
(1 − ϕ) dπa = 1 −
∫
1 dπa +
∫
ϕ dπa =
∫
ϕ dπa = (^ϕ)(a).
For instance, the formula ^0 gives the probability of reaching a terminating state (note that the
expected value of a {0, 1}-valued function f is just the probability of f −1[{1}]), so
^^0
gives the expected value, taken over successor states in the first step, of the probability of reaching,
in the second step, a terminating state.
Remark 2.3. The probabilistic µ-calculus [8, 21] extends the above syntax by adding fixed point
operators and moreover interprets conjunction as Łukasiewicz fuzzy conjunction ⊗, given by r ⊗
q = max(r+q−1, 0), instead of as minimum. The latter interpretation (asminimum) is referred to as
Zadeh semantics. Zadeh semantics is well-known to embed into Łukasiewicz semantics by a simple
translation, so as indicated above quantitative probabilistic modal logic (without ⊖) is a fragment of
the probabilistic µ-calculus. The main reason that Zadeh instead of Łukasiewicz semantics is used
in the present work and also by van Breugel and Worrell [42] is that Łukasiewicz conjunction
would fail to be non-expansive (e.g. r ⊗ r = max(2r − 1, 0)). In fact, as already pointed out by Wild
et al. [45] it would make logical distance discrete as it allows for arbitrary amplification of small
deviations of truth degrees. Additional difficulties would arise with Kantorovich distance.
2.2 antitative Probabilistic First-Order Logic
As the first-order correspondence language of quantitative probabilistic modal logic, we now pro-
ceed to introduce quantitative probabilistic first-order logic, with formulas ϕ,ψ , . . . defined by the
grammar
ϕ,ψ ::= c | p(x) | x = y | ϕ ⊖ c | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ψ | ∃x .ϕ | x^⌈y : ϕ⌉.
Again, p ranges over propositional atoms and c over Q ∩ [0, 1] while x and y range over a fixed
countably infinite reservoir of variables. The semantics of the propositional part is essentially as
in the modal logic. Equality is crisp. Existential quantification is interpreted by taking suprema,
and formulas of the form x^⌈y : ϕ⌉ denote the expected truth value of ϕ at successors y of x . We
have the expected notions of free and bound variables, under the additional proviso that y (but
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not x !) is bound in x^⌈y : ϕ⌉. The (quantifier) rank of a formula ϕ is the maximal nesting depth of
the variable-binding operators ∃ and ^ and propositional atoms p in ϕ; e.g. ∃x . x^⌈y : p(y)⌉ has
rank 3. We denote the quantifier rank of a probabilistic first-order formula ϕ by qr(ϕ).
Formally,we define the semantics of the logic by assigning a truth valueϕ(a¯) ∈ [0, 1] to a formula
ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)with free variables at most x1, . . . , xn , depending on a probabilistic transition system
A = (A, (pA)p ∈At, π
A) and a vector a¯ = (a1, . . . ,an) ∈ A
n of values for the free variables. We
define ϕ(a¯) recursively by essentially the same clauses as in quantitative probabilistic modal logic
for the propositional constructs, and
p(xi )(a¯) = p
A(ai )
(xi = x j )(a¯) = 1 if ai = aj , and 0 otherwise
(∃x0.ϕ(x0, x1, . . . , xn))(a¯) =
∨
a0 ∈A ϕ(a0,a1, . . . ,an)
(xi^⌈y : ϕ(y, x1, . . . , xn)⌉)(a¯) =
∫
ϕ( · ,a1, . . . ,an) dπai .
Example 2.4. In quantitative probabilistic first-order logic, we can express the transition proba-
bility from x to y as x^⌈z : z = y⌉, and the probability of a finite set {y1, . . . ,yn} as x^⌈z : z =
y1 ∨ · · · ∨ z = yn⌉. The formula ϕ = x^⌈z : z^⌈w : w = y⌉⌉ denotes the expected probability,
in the next step, of reaching y after another step, which indeed coincides with the more intuitive
reading of ϕ as the probability of reaching y from x in two independently distributed steps. The
formula ∃y. x^⌈z : z = y⌉ denotes, roughly, the probability of the most probable successor of x ,
or more precisely the supremum over the probabilities of all successors.
We have a standard translation ST from quantitative probabilistic modal logic into quantitative
probabilistic first-order logic. As in the classical case, ST is indexed over a variable x representing
the current evaluation point. For a modal formula ϕ, we define STx (ϕ) recursively by
STx (p) = p(x)
STx (^ϕ) = x^⌈y : STy (ϕ)⌉,
and by commutation with all other constructs. An easy induction shows that the standard trans-
lation preserves probabilistic truth degrees:
Lemma 2.5. For every modal formula ϕ and every state a in a probabilistic transition system, ϕ(a) =
STx (ϕ)(a).
The standard translation thus identifies quantitative probabilistic modal logic as a fragment of
quantitative probabilistic first-order logic.
Remark 2.6. As indicated in the introduction, we take the treatment of the modality ^ in our
first-order syntax from Litak et al.’s (two-valued) coalgebraic predicate logic [27], which in turn is
inspired by Chang’s modal predicate logic [7]; also, the syntactic definition of the above standard
translation essentially coincides with the translation from coalgebraic modal logic into coalgebraic
predicate logic. Litak et al. [26] point out that coalgebraic predicate logic may equivalently be seen
as the extension of the purely modal logic to a hybrid logic with nominals, satisfaction operators,
local binding, and the universal modality. The same comment applies to our quantitative logic.
If one were to use our expectation operator ^ in the context of a two-valued logic, then expec-
tation would just turn into probability (we have already observed in Remark 2.2 that the expected
value of a {0, 1}-valued function f is just the probability of f −1[{1}]), and moreover one would
then have to convert probabilities into binary truth values, say by using them in arithmetic con-
ditions. This is precisely what happens in Halpern’s two-valued type-1 or statistical probabilistic
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first-order logic, which features weight expressions wx (ϕ) that denote the probability of a ran-
domly sampled state x to satisfy ϕ, and are used in formulas of first-order real arithmetic [19].
(More precisely, the weight operator can more generally be applied to vectors of variables; we
leave a corresponding extension of our logic to future work.) Semantically, type-1 probabilistic
first-order logic further differs from our above logic in that it is interpreted over structures that
have crisp predicates and use only a single global probability distribution on the state set, instead
of one distribution per state. In our syntax, a global distribution can be emulated by restricting
the x^⌈y : ϕ⌉ construct to be applied only to a single fixed globally free variable x . Summing
up, quantitative probabilistic first-order logic can, as suggested earlier, be seen as a quantitative
variant of type-1 probabilistic first-order logic.
2.3 Coalgebraic Modelling
Universal coalgebra [32] serves as a generic framework formodelling state-based systems, with the
system type encapsulated as a set functor. Althoughwe are only concernedwith a concrete system
type, viz. probabilistic transition systems, in the present paper, we do need coalgebraic methods to
some degree. In particular, the requisite background on behavioural distances [42, 41, 2] is largely
based on coalgebraic techniques, and moreover we will need the final coalgebra at one point in the
development. We require only basic definitions, which we recapitulate here and then instantiate
to the case of probabilistic transition systems.
Recall first that a set functor F : Set → Set consists of an assignment of a set FX to every set X
and a map F f : FX → FY to every map f : X → Y , preserving identities and composition. The
core example of a functor for the present purposes is the distribution functor D, which assigns
to a set X the set DX of discrete probability measures on X , and to a map f : X → Y the map
D f : DX → DY that takes image measures; explicitly, D f (µ) is the image measure of µ along f ,
given byD f (µ)(A) = µ(f −1[A]). Functors can be combined by taking products and sums: Given set
functors F ,G : Set→ Set, the set functors F×G, F+G : Set → Set are given by (F×G)X = FX×GX
and (F + G)X = FX + GX , respectively, with the evident action on maps in both cases; here, +
denotes disjoint union as usual. Every set C induces a constant functor, also denoted C and given
by CX = C and C f = idC for every set X and every map f . Moreover, the identity functor id is
given by idX = X and id f = f for all sets X and all maps f .
An F -coalgebra (A, ξ ) for a set functor F consists of a set X of states and a transition map ξ :
A → FA, thought of as assigning to each state a ∈ A a structured collection ξ (a) of successors. A
D-coalgebra (A, ξ ), for instance, is just a Markov chain: its transition map ξ : A → DA assigns
to each state a distribution over successor states. Similarly, probabilistic transition systems in the
sense defined above are coalgebras (A, ξ ) for the set functor [0, 1]At × (D + 1): If ξ (a) = (f , π ),
then f : At → [0, 1] determines the truth values of the propositional atoms at the state a, and
π is either a discrete probability measure determining the successors of a or a designated value
denoting termination. The variant of probabilistic transition systems considered by van Breugel
and Worrell as discussed in Remark 2.1, which indexes probabilistic transition relations over a
setAct of actions andmoreover uses unrestricted subdistributions, corresponds to coalgebras (A, ξ )
for the set functor D(id + 1)Act – given a state a and an action c ∈ Act, ξ (a)(c) ∈ D(A + 1) is
a subdistribution over successor states of a, with the summand 1 serving to absorb the weight
missing to obtain total weight 1.
A morphism f : (A, ξ ) → (B, ζ ) between F -coalgebras (A, ξ ) and (B, ζ ) is a map f : A→ B such
that
F f (ξ (a)) = ζ (f (a))
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for all states a ∈ A. Morphisms should be thought of as behaviour-preserving maps or functional
bisimulations. E.g. f : A→ B is a morphism ofD-coalgebras (i.e. Markov chains) (A, ξ ) and (B, ζ )
if for each set Y ⊆ B and each state a ∈ A,
ζ (f (a))(Y ) = ξ (a)(f −1[Y ]),
i.e. the probability of reaching Y from f (a) is the same as that of reaching f −1[Y ] from a. Mor-
phisms of probabilistic transition systems, viewed as coalgebras, satisfy a similar condition for the
successor distributions, and additionally preserve the truth values of propositional atoms (formal
details are given in Remark 4.13).
An F -coalgebra (Z , ζ ) is final if for every F -coalgebra (A, ξ ) there exists exactly one morphism
(A, ξ ) → (Z , ζ ). Final coalgebras are unique up to isomorphism if they exist, and should be thought
of as having as states all possible behaviours of states in F -coalgebras. For our present purposes,
we do not need an explicit description of the final coalgebra; it suffices to know that since the
functor describing probabilistic transition systems is accessible (more precisely ω1-accessible), a
final coalgebra for it, i.e. a final probabilistic transition system, exists [3].
3 BEHAVIOURAL DISTANCES AND GAMES
FOR PROBABILISTIC TRANSITION SYSTEMS
Wewill now discuss several notions of behavioural distance for probabilistic transition systems: via
fixed point iteration à la Wasserstein/Kantorovich, via games and via modal logics. We will mostly
focus on depth-n distances, defining the unbounded distance only for one of the cases in order to
be able to formulate our main target result, which characterizes first-order formulas that are non-
expansive w.r.t. unbounded-depth behavioural distance. We will eventually show (Section 4) that
at finite depth, all these distances coincide. It has been shown in previous work [11, 42, 41] that
the two unbounded-depth distances defined via Kantorovich fixed point iteration and via the logic,
respectively, coincide in very similar settings; such results can be seen as probabilistic variants of
the Hennessy-Milner theorem.
We start by defining requisite standard notions regarding pseudo-metric spaces.
Definition 3.1 (Pseudometric spaces, non-expansive maps, function spaces). Given a non-empty
set X , a (bounded) pseudometric on X is a function d : X × X → [0, 1] such that for all x ,y, z ∈
X , the following axioms hold: d(x , x) = 0 (reflexivity), d(x ,y) = d(y, x) (symmetry), d(x , z) ≤
d(x ,y) + d(y, z) (triangle inequality). If additionally d(x ,y) = 0 implies x = y, then d is a metric. A
(pseudo)metric space is a pair (X ,d)where X is a set and d is a (pseudo)metric on X . We equip the
unit interval [0, 1] with the standard Euclidean distance de , de (x ,y) = |x − y |.
A function f : X → Y between pseudometric spaces (X ,d1), (Y ,d2) is non-expansive if d2 ◦ (f ×
f ) ≤ d1, i.e. d2(f (x), f (y)) ≤ d1(x ,y) for all x ,y. We then write
f : (X ,d1) →1 (Y ,d2).
The space of non-expansive functions (X ,d1) →1 (Y ,d2) is equipped with the supremum
(pseudo)metric d∞ defined by
d∞(f ,д) = sup
x ∈X
d2(f (x),д(x))
In the special case (Y ,d2) = ([0, 1],de), we will also denote d∞(f ,д) as ‖ f − д‖∞.
We denote by Bϵ (a) = {x ∈ X | d(a, x) ≤ ϵ} the ball of radius ϵ around a in (X ,d). The space
(X ,d) is totally bounded if for every ϵ > 0 there exists a finite ϵ-cover, i.e. finitely many elements
a1, . . . ,an ∈ X such that X =
⋃n
i=1 Bϵ (ai ).
Recall that a metric space is compact iff it is complete and totally bounded.
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Remark 3.2. Whenever we have a bounded pseudometric d on some set X , we can construct a
(bounded) pseudometric d¯ on the set X + 1 by defining
d¯(∗, ∗) = 0
d¯(∗, x1) = d¯(x1, ∗) = 1
d¯(x1, x2) = d(x1, x2)
for all x1, x2 ∈ X . We will usually omit the bar in d¯ and just use d to denote either pseudometric.
Next we introduce the notions of Wasserstein and Kantorovich lifting, which coincide according
to the Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality. To this end, we first need the notion of a coupling of two
probability distributions, from which the original distributions are factored out as marginals.
Definition 3.3. Let π1 and π2 be discrete probability measures onA and B, respectively. We denote
by π1 ⊗ π2 the set of couplings of π1 and π2, i.e. probability measures µ such that π1 and π2 are
marginals of µ:
• for all a ∈ A,
∑
b ∈B µ(a,b) = π1(a);
• for all b ∈ B,
∑
a∈A µ(a,b) = π2(b).
Definition 3.4 (Wasserstein and Kantorovich distances). Let (X ,d) be a pseudometric space. We
define two pseudometrics on the set DX , the Kantorovich distance d↑ and the Wasserstein dis-
tance d↓:
d↑(π1, π2) =
∨
f : (X ,d )→1([0,1],de )
|
∫
f dπ1 −
∫
f dπ2 |
d↓(π1, π2) =
∧
µ ∈π1⊗π2
∫
d dµ .
The notation d↑,d↓ is meant as a mnemonic for the fact that these distances are obtained via
suprema respectively via infima.
Remark 3.5. Intuitively these distances have the following meaning, when seen from the point
of view of transportation theory [43]: Assume that the probability distributions π1, π2 denote a
supply respectively demand present at the elements of X , which are nodes in a network. The
distance between two nodes x ,y ∈ X is d(x ,y). Now, the Wasserstein distance d↓ on probability
distributions looks for the optimal transport plan µ : X × X → [0, 1] specifying that µ(x ,y) units
are transported from x to y. Then
∫
d dµ is the cost of this transport plan, where we sum up the
units µ(x ,y) being transported, multiplied with the distance d(x ,y). We are looking for the best
transport plan with the minimal cost.
The Kantorovich distance, on the other hand, considers the same scenario from the point of view
of a logistics company that is hired to perform the transport. The logistics company sets prices at
each location via a price function f : X → [0, 1], buys surplus supply at x for the price f (x), and
sells required demand at y for the price f (y). Non-expansiveness of such price functions means
that f (x) − f (y) ≤ d(x ,y) for all x ,y ∈ X . Otherwise the logistics firm would not be hired, since it
is cheaper to perform the transport directly. Now the Kantorovich distance is the maximal profit
of the logistics company, where the supremum is taken over all possible (non-expansive) price
functions.
The above notions of lifting a distance on X to a distance on probability distributions over X can
be used to give fixed point equations for behavioural distances on probabilistic transition systems.
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Definition 3.6 (Fixed point iteration à la Wasserstein/Kantorovich). Given a probabilistic tran-
sition system A = (A, (pA)p ∈At, π
A), we define the following chain of behavioural distances via
fixed point iteration à la Wasserstein:
dW0 (a,b) = 0 and d
W
n+1(a,b) =
∨
p ∈At
|p(a) − p(b)| ∨ (dWn )
↓(πa, πb )
Similarly we obtain the following chain of behavioural distances via fixed point iteration à la
Kantorovich:
dK0 (a,b) = 0 and d
K
n+1(a,b) =
∨
p ∈At
|p(a) − p(b)| ∨ (dKn )
↑(πa, πb ).
We refer to these distances more succinctly as the depth-n Kantorovich and Wasserstein distances,
respectively.
In both cases, we start with the zero pseudometric, and in the next iteration lift the pseudomet-
ric dn from the previous step via Wasserstein/Kantorovich. This lifted metric is then applied to the
probability distributions πa , πb associated with a,b. (Note that we are following the convention in
Remark 3.2 in connection with the coalgebraic representation in Section 2, since πa , πb could be
probability distributions that sum up to 0 and are hence represented by ∗). In addition we take the
maximum with the supremum over the distances for all predicates p ∈ At.
Example 3.7. In order to illustrate the behavioural distance, in particular theWasserstein distance,
we consider the example probabilistic transition system depicted below, where ϵ ∈ [0, 12 ]. For
simplicity we assume that there are no propositional atoms. States without outgoing transitions
are terminating.
x
1
2
~~⑥⑥
⑥⑥
⑥⑥
⑥⑥ 1
2
  ❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆ y
1
2−ϵ
~~⑥⑥
⑥⑥
⑥⑥
⑥⑥ 1
2+ϵ
  ❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆
x1
1
2
~~⑥⑥
⑥⑥
⑥⑥
⑥⑥ 12
  ❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆
x2
1
XX y1
1
2−ϵ
~~⑥⑥
⑥⑥
⑥⑥
⑥⑥ 12+ϵ
  ❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆
y2
1
WW
x3 x4 1ff y3 y4 1ff
In fact, the depth-3 Wasserstein distance between x and y is dW3 (x ,y) = ϵ − ϵ
2, which can be ex-
plained as follows: The depth-0 distance is 0, while in the depth-1 distance, terminating states have
distance 1 from transient states. Moreover, it is not hard to see that dW2 (x1,y1) = ϵ , d
W
2 (x1,y2) =
1
2 ,
dW2 (x2,y1) =
1
2 − ϵ , d
W
2 (x2,y2) = 0, since these are exactly the probabilities for which they show
differing behaviour.
So in order to determine the depth-3Wasserstein distance between x andy, we have to solve the
following transport problem, based on dW2 . The supply (given by the probability distribution πx )
is written to the left of x1, x2 and the demand (given by the probability distribution πy ) is written
to the right of y1,y2.
[πx (x1) =
1
2 ] x1
ϵ
1
2
❂❂
❂❂
❂❂
❂❂
❂
y1 [πy (y1) =
1
2 − ϵ]
[πx (x2) =
1
2 ] x2 0
1
2−ϵ
✁✁✁✁✁✁✁✁
y2 [πy (y2) =
1
2 + ϵ]
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The best transport plan is to transport 12 − ϵ from x1 to y1 (where the distance is ϵ), ϵ from x1 to y2
(distance 12 ) and
1
2 from x2 to y2 (distance 0). So, summing up, we have d
W
3 (x ,y) = (
1
2 − ϵ) · ϵ + ϵ ·
1
2 +
1
2 · 0 = ϵ − ϵ
2.
We now introduce a key tool for our technical development, a novel bisimulation game inspired
by the definition of the Wasserstein distance.
Definition 3.8 (Bisimulation game). Given probabilistic transition systems A,B, a0 ∈ A,b0 ∈ B,
and ϵ0 ∈ [0, 1], the ϵ0-bisimulation game for a0 and b0 is played by the spoiler S and the duplicator
D, with rules as follows:
• Configurations: triples (a,b, ϵ) with states a ∈ A, b ∈ B and the maximal allowed deviation
ϵ ∈ [0, 1].
• Starting configuration: (a0,b0, ϵ0)
• Moves: in each round, D first picks a probability measure µ ∈ πa ⊗ πb . Then, D distributes
the deviation ϵ over all pairs (a′,b ′) of successors, i.e. picks a function ϵ ′ : A×B → [0, 1] such
that
∫
ϵ ′ dµ ≤ ϵ . Finally, S picks a pair (a′,b ′) with µ(a′,b ′) > 0 and the new configuration
is then (a′,b ′, ϵ ′(a′,b ′)).
• D wins if both states are terminating or ϵ = 1.
• S wins if exactly one state is terminating and ϵ < 1.
• Winning condition: |p(a) − p(b)| ≤ ϵ for all atoms p.
The game comes in two variants, the (unbounded) bisimulation game and the n-round bisimula-
tion game, where n ≥ 0. D wins if the winning condition holds before every round, otherwise S
wins. More precisely, D wins the unbounded game if she can force infinite play and the n-round
game once n rounds have been played (the winning condition is not checked after the last round,
so in particular, any 0-round game is an immediate win for D).
Remark 3.9. The above bisimulation game is designed to fit the Wasserstein lifting. It differs
from bisimulation games in the literature (e.g. [12]) in a number of salient features. A particularly
striking aspect is that D’s moves are not similar to S’s moves, and moreover D in fact moves
before S . Intuitively, D is required to commit beforehand to a strategy that she will use to respond
to S’s next move. Another aspect worth noting is that the distance bound ϵ changes as the game
is being played, a complication forced by the arithmetic nature of probabilistic transition systems.
Based on the game we obtain the following notions of depth-n and unbounded game distance.
Definition 3.10. Given a probabilistic transition system A = (A, (pA)p ∈At, π
A), we define the
following depth-n game distance:
dGn (a,b) =
∧
{ϵ | D wins the n-round bisimulation game on (a,b, ϵ)}.
Similarly the (unbounded-depth) game distance is defined by
dG (a,b) =
∧
{ϵ | D wins the bisimulation game on (a,b, ϵ)}.
Example 3.11. In order to illustrate the game we revisit the transition system from Example 3.7.
We start with the configuration (x ,y, ϵ−ϵ2) and sketch awinning strategy forD. Recall thatD must
in particular find a coupling µ with marginals πx , πy . What she can in fact do is use the optimal
transport plan from Example 3.7. She thus takes µ(x1,y1) =
1
2 − ϵ , µ(x1,y2) = ϵ , µ(x2,y2) =
1
2 , and
for all other pairs the value of µ is 0. She then needs to distribute the allowed deviation ϵ − ϵ2
over all pairs of successors, which she does using the function ϵ ′ with ϵ ′(x1,y1) = ϵ , ϵ
′(x1,y2) =
1
2 ,
ϵ ′(x2,y1) =
1
2 − ϵ , ϵ
′(x2,y2) = 0 (this is is exactly the distance d
W
2 ); it can then be easily checked
that
∫
ϵ ′ dµ ≤ ϵ − ϵ2 (see the computation in Example 3.7)
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Now S picks one of the pairs xi ,yj and the game continues in the configuration (xi ,yj , ϵ
′(xi ,yj )).
Since ϵ ′(xi ,yj ) is the 2-step behavioural distance between xi and yj , the remaining game is won
by D.
Finally we define the depth-n logical distance via quantitative probabilistic modal logic as recalled
in Section 2, restricting to formulas of rank at most n.
Definition 3.12. Given a probabilistic transition systemA = (A, (pA)p ∈At, π
A), we define depth-
n logical distance dLn as
dLn (a,b) =
∨
rk(ϕ )≤n
|ϕ(a) − ϕ(b)|.
The equivalence of the four bounded-depth behavioural distances introduced above will be shown
in Theorem 4.2.
Behavioural distance forms the yardstick for our notion of bisimulation invariance; for definite-
ness:
Definition 3.13. A quantitative, i.e. [0, 1]-valued, property P of states in probabilistic transition
systems, or a formula defining such a property, is bisimulation-invariant if P is non-expansive w.r.t.
the game distance, i.e. for states a,b in probabilistic transition systems A,B, respectively,
|P(a) − P(b)| ≤ dG (a,b).
Similarly, P is depth-n bisimulation invariant, or finite-depth bisimulation invariant if mention of n
is omitted, if P is non-expansive w.r.t. dGn in the same sense.
It is easy to see that quantitative probabilistic modal formulas are bisimulation-invariant, or as a
slogan
quantitative probabilistic modal logic is bisimulation-invariant,
We refrain from giving an explicit proof, as the results of the next section (Remark 4.4) will imply
that quantitative probabilistic modal logic is in fact even finite-depth bisimulation-invariant (a
stronger invariance property since clearly dGn ≤ d
G ).
4 MODAL APPROXIMATION AT FINITE DEPTH
Weproceed to establish themost important stepping stone on theway to the eventual van Benthem
theorem: We show that every quantitative property of states in probabilistic transition systems
that is non-expansive w.r.t. bounded-depth behavioural distance can be approximated by modal
formulas of bounded rank. We prove this simultaneously with coincidence of the various finite-
depth behavioural pseudometrics defined in the previous section.
To begin, we prove separately that the pseudometric dGn defined by our bisimulation game co-
incides with the Wasserstein pseudometric dWn :
Lemma 4.1. We have dGn = d
W
n .
Proof. Induction over n. The base case n = 0 is clear: the 0-round game is an immediate win
for D, so dG0 = d
W
0 = 0. We proceed with the inductive step from n to n + 1.
So let a and b be states in probabilistic transition systemsA,B, respectively. If a and b are both
terminating, then dGn+1(a,b) = d
W
n+1(a,b) = 0. If exactly one of a,b is terminating, then d
G
n+1(a,b) =
dWn+1(a,b) = 1. Now assume that both a and b are transient.
“≥”: Let dGn+1(a,b) ≤ ϵ , so D wins the (n + 1)-round bisimulation game on (a,b, ϵ). We show
that dWn+1(a,b) ≤ ϵ . First, for every p ∈ At, |p(a) − p(b)| ≤ ϵ by the winning condition. Second, let
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µ ∈ πa ⊗ πb , ϵ
′ : A×B → [0, 1] be D’s choices in the first turn. By assumption, D wins the n-round
bisimulation game on (a′,b ′, ϵ ′(a′,b ′)) for every a′ ∈ A,b ′ ∈ B, so dWn = d
G
n ≤ ϵ
′ by induction,
and thus
∫
dWn dµ ≤
∫
ϵ ′ dµ ≤ ϵ .
“≤”: Let dWn+1(a,b) < ϵ . It suffices to give a winning strategy for D in the (n + 1)-round bisimula-
tion game on (a,b, ϵ) (implying dGn+1(a,b) ≤ ϵ). The winning condition in the initial configuration
follows immediately from the assumption. Also by the assumption, there exists µ ∈ πa ⊗ πb such
that
∫
dWn dµ < ϵ . As πa and πb are discrete, the set
R := {(a′,b ′) | πa(a
′) > 0 and πb (b
′) > 0}
is countable; so we can write R = {(a1,b1), (a2,b2), . . . }. Now put δ = ϵ −
∫
dWn dµ and define
ϵ ′(ai ,bi ) = d
W
n (ai ,bi ) + 2
−iδ for (ai ,bi ) ∈ R and ϵ
′(a′,b ′) = 0 for (a′,b ′) < R. Then∫
ϵ ′ dµ ≤
∫
dWn dµ + δ = ϵ,
so playing µ and ϵ ′ constitutes a legal move for D. Now, since µ ∈ πa ⊗ πb , µ(a
′
,b ′) = 0 for all
(a′,b ′) < R, S must pick some (ai ,bi ) ∈ R. Then
dGn (ai ,bi ) = d
W
n (ai ,bi ) < ϵ
′(ai ,bi ),
so D wins the n-round game on (ai ,bi , ϵ
′(ai ,bi )). 
The coincidence of the remaining pseudometrics is proved in one big induction (following a sim-
ilar structure as Wild et al. [45]), along with total boundedness (needed later in this Section to
apply a variant of the Arzelà-Ascoli theorem) and the mentioned modal approximability of depth-
n bisimulation-invariant properties. We phrase the latter as density of the modal formulas of rank
at most n in the non-expansive function space (Definition 3.1):
Theorem 4.2. Let A be a probabilistic transition system with state set A. Then for all n ≥ 0,
(1) we have dGn = d
W
n = d
K
n = d
L
n =: dn on A;
(2) the pseudometric space (A,dn) is totally bounded; and
(3) Ln is a dense subset of (A,dn) →1 ([0, 1],de).
Remark 4.3. As indicated in the introduction, van Breugel and Worrell [42] show similar but
unbounded-rank versions of two of the claims in the above theorem, namely coincidence of an
unbounded Kantorovich-style distance and an unbounded logical distance, and density of the set
of all modal formulas in the space of non-expansive functions w.r.t. unbounded behavioural dis-
tance, both essentially amounting to a quantitative Hennessy-Milner theorem. As discussed in
the introduction, the bounds on modal rank and bisimulation depth are key features in the above
theorem.
Remark 4.4. FromTheorem4.2, it is immediate that as claimed at the end of Section 3, quantitative
probabilistic modal logic is finite-depth bisimulation-invariant: By definition of dLn , every ϕ ∈ Ln is
dLn -invariant, and hence invariant w.r.t. all other finite-depth behavioural distances.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. By Lemma 4.1, for Item 1 we just have to show that dWn = d
K
n = d
L
n . We
proceed to prove all claims simultaneously by induction on n.
For the base casen = 0, the behavioural distances are all trivial: dW0 = 0 and d
K
0 = 0 by definition
and dL0 = 0 because all formulas of rank 0 are (propositional combinations of) constants. In par-
ticular, the space (A,d0) is totally bounded. Finally, because every function that is non-expansive
wrt. d0 must be constant, Item 3 follows by density of Q ∩ [0, 1] in [0, 1] since the modal syntax
includes constants c ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1].
The induction step is distributed across a number of lemmas, stated and proved next. 
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For the remainder of this section, we fix a model A and n > 0, and assume as the inductive
hypothesis that all claims in Theorem 4.2 hold for all n′ < n.
For any pseudometric space (X ,d), the relation x ∼ y : ⇐⇒ d(x ,y) = 0 is an equivalence
relation. The quotient set X/∼ is made into a metric space (X/∼,d ′), the metric quotient of (X ,d),
by taking d ′([x], [y]) = d(x ,y).
We need the following version of the Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality [13, Proposition 11.8.1]:
Lemma 4.5 (Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality). Let (X ,d) be a separable metric space, and let P1(X )
denote the space of probability measures µ : B(X ) → [0, 1] on the Borel σ -algebra B(X ) such that∫
d(x , · ) dµ < ∞ for some x ∈ X . Then for µ1, µ2 ∈ P1(X ),∧
µ ∈µ1⊗µ2
∫
d dµ =
∨
f : (X ,d )→1([0,1],de )
|
∫
f dµ1 −
∫
f dµ2 |.
(Recall from Definition 3.3 that µ1 ⊗ µ2 is the set of couplings of µ1, µ2.) Using this equality, we
obtain coincidence of the Kantorovich and Wasserstein distances:
Lemma 4.6. We have dWn = d
K
n on A.
Proof. Essentially, we need to transfer Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality to the slightly more gen-
eral case of pseudometrics. Explicitly, let (B,d) be the metric quotient of (A,dn−1), and letp : A→ B
be the projectionmap. By construction,p is an isometry. Both the Kantorovich and theWasserstein
lifting preserve isometries [2], so for all discrete probability measures π1, π2 on A,
(dn−1)
↑(π1, π2) = d
↑((Dp)π1, (Dp)π2)
= d↓((Dp)π1, (Dp)π2)
= (dn−1)
↓(π1, π2).
In the second step we have applied Lemma 4.5 to the metric space (B,d), noting that every discrete
probability measure can be defined on the Borel σ -algebra and every totally bounded space is
separable. 
For the purpose of relating the logical distance to the Kantorovich distance, we note next that
our modality ^ is non-expansive. Explicitly, we extend ^ to act on non-expansive functions
f : (A,dn) →1 ([0, 1],de) by
^ f : (A,dn) →1 ([0, 1],de)
(^ f )(a) =
∫
f dπa .
Lemma 4.7. The map f 7→ ^ f is non-expansive w.r.t. the supremum metric.
Proof. Let ‖ f − д‖∞ ≤ ϵ ; we have to show ‖^ f − ^д‖∞ ≤ ϵ . So let a ∈ A; then
|(^ f )(a) − (^д)(a)| =
∫
(f − д) dπa ≤
∫
ϵ dπa ≤ ϵ,
as required. 
This allows us to discharge the remaining equality of behavioural distances, regarding the Kan-
torovich distance and the logical distance:
Lemma 4.8. We have dKn = d
L
n on A.
Proof. Let a,b ∈ A and consider the map
G : (F ,d∞) →1 ([0, 1],de), f 7→ |(^ f )(a) − (^ f )(b)|,
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where F = (A,dn−1) →1 ([0, 1],de). ThenG is a continuous function because all of its constituents
are continuous (in particular, ^ is continuous by Lemma 4.7).
By the induction hypothesis, and because density is preserved by continuous maps,G[Ln−1] is
a dense subset ofG[F ]. Thus,
dKn (a,b) =
∨
p ∈At
|p(a) − p(b)| ∨
∨
G[F ] =
∨
p ∈At
|p(a) − p(b)| ∨
∨
G[Ln−1]
=
∨
p ∈At
|p(a) − p(b)| ∨
∨
rkϕ≤n−1
|(^ϕ)(a) − (^ϕ)(b)| =
∨
rkϕ≤n
|ϕ(a) − ϕ(b)| = dLn (a,b).
To prove the penultimate step, we first note that “≤” follows immediately. To see “≥”, we proceed
by induction over the Boolean combinations of atoms p ∈ At and formulas ^ϕ, where ϕ ∈ Ln−1,
using that for any formulas ϕ,ψ and c ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]:
|(ϕ ⊖ c)(a) − (ϕ ⊖ c)(b)| ≤ |ϕ(a) − ϕ(b)|
|(¬ϕ)(a) − (¬ϕ)(b)| = |ϕ(a) − ϕ(b)|
|(ϕ ∧ψ )(a) − (ϕ ∧ψ )(b)| ≤ |ϕ(a) − ϕ(b)| ∨ |ψ (a) −ψ (b)|. 
We make use of the following two lemmas [45], which are versions of the Arzelà-Ascoli theorem
and the Stone-Weierstraß theoremwhere function spaces are restricted to non-expansive functions
instead of the more general continuous functions, but the underlying spaces are only required to
be totally bounded instead of compact:
Lemma 4.9 (Arzelà-Ascoli for totally bounded spaces). Let (X ,d1), (Y ,d2) be totally bounded pseu-
dometric spaces. Then the space (X ,d1) →1 (Y ,d2), equipped with the supremum pseudometric, is
totally bounded.
Lemma 4.10 (Stone-Weierstraß for totally bounded spaces). Let (X ,d) be a totally bounded pseu-
dometric space, and let L be a subset of F := (X ,d) →1 ([0, 1],de) such that f1, f2 ∈ L implies
min(f1, f2),max(f1, f2) ∈ L. Then L is dense in F if each f ∈ F can be approximated at each pair
of points by functions in L; that is for all ϵ > 0 and all x1, x2 ∈ X there exists д ∈ L such that
max(| f (x1) − д(x1)|, | f (x2) − д(x2)|) ≤ ϵ .
We use the Arzelà-Ascoli theorem to complete the inductive step for Item 2 in Theorem 4.2. This is
done in the following lemma – related lemmas have already appeared in [45] (for a fuzzy powerset
functor) and [23] (for general functors).
Lemma 4.11. (A,dn) is a totally bounded pseudometric space.
Proof (sketch). By the induction hypothesis, and using Lemma 4.9, we know that F :=
(A,dn−1) →1 ([0, 1],de) is totally bounded.
Let ϵ > 0. As Ln−1 is dense in F , there exist finitely many ϕ1, . . . ,ϕm ∈ Ln−1 such that⋃m
i=1 B ϵ8 (ϕi ) = F . From these formulas, together with the propositional atoms p1, . . . ,pk , we can
construct the map
I : A→ [0, 1]k+m, a 7→ (p1(a), . . . ,pk (a), (^ϕ1)(a), . . . , (^ϕm)(a)).
It turns out that I is an ϵ4 -isometry, i.e. |dn(a,b) − ‖I (a) − I (b)‖∞ | ≤
ϵ
4 for all a,b ∈ A. Thus, by the
triangle inequality, we can take preimages to turn a finite ϵ4 -cover of [0, 1]
k+m (a compact, hence
totally bounded space) into a finite ϵ-cover of (A,dn). 
This covers the total boundedness claim in Theorem 4.2, and subsequently enables us to use the
above version of the Stone-Weierstraß theorem (Lemma 4.10) to prove the density claim:
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Lemma 4.12. Ln is a dense subset of (A,dn) →1 ([0, 1],de).
Proof (sketch). By Lemma 4.11, (A,dn) is totally bounded; since moreover Ln is closed under
∧ and ∨, we can apply Lemma 4.10.
It thus remains to give, for each non-expansive map f : (A,dn) →1 ([0, 1],de), states a,b ∈ A
and ϵ > 0, a formula ϕ ∈ Ln such that | f (a) − ϕ(a)| ≤ ϵ and | f (b) − ϕ(b)| ≤ ϵ .
To construct such a formula, we note that | f (a) − f (b)| ≤ dLn (a,b) (by non-expansiveness), so
there exists some ψ ∈ Ln such that |ψ (a) −ψ (b)| ≥ | f (a) − f (b)| − ϵ . The desired formula ϕ can
now be constructed fromψ with the help of truncated subtraction ⊖. 
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.2. Now that we have a way to approximate depth-k
bisimulation-invariant properties by modal formulas of rank k , on any fixed model, we need a
way to make such an approximation uniform across all possible models. Put differently, we need
a probabilistic transition system that realizes all behaviours up to depth-n bisimilarity. Unlike in
the fuzzy setting [45] (where a final system fails to exist for cardinality reasons), we can use a
final coalgebra, i.e. a final probabilistic transition system, for this purpose. We have recalled in
Section 2.3 that such a final probabilistic transition system, denoted F in the following, exists. As
explained in Section 2.3, F even realizes all behaviours up to bisimilarity, in a sense that we will
make more precise presently. Recall that F is formally characterized by admitting a unique mor-
phism from every probabilistic transition system. We recall the preservation properties of such
morphisms from Section 2.3:
Remark 4.13. If f : A → B is a morphism of probabilistic transition systems (seen as coalgebras),
then, by unfolding definitions, we see that for all a ∈ A:
• for all p ∈ At, pA(a) = pB(f (a)),
• a is terminating ⇐⇒ f (a) is terminating,
• for all b ′ ∈ B: π B(f (a),b ′) =
∑
f (a′)=b ′ π
A(a,a′).
Using these properties, we see that morphisms preserve behaviour on-the-nose, that is:
Lemma 4.14. Let f : A → B be a coalgebra morphism. Then, for any a0 ∈ A, d
G (a0, f (a0)) = 0.
Proof. We show that D wins the bisimulation game for (a0, f (a0), 0) by maintaining the invari-
ant that the current configuration is of the form (a,b, 0)withb = f (a). By Remark 4.13, this ensures
that the winning condition always holds. It remains to show that D can maintain the invariant.
In each round, D begins by picking µ(a′,b ′) = πa(a
′) if b ′ = f (a′) and 0 otherwise, and ϵ ′ = 0.
We can see that µ ∈ πa ⊗ πb , because, still following Remark 4.13,∑
b ′∈B
µ(a′,b ′) = πa(a
′) and
∑
a′∈A
µ(a′,b ′) =
∑
f (a′)=b ′
πa(a
′) = πb (b
′)
for all a′ ∈ A and b ′ ∈ B. Also, clearly
∫
ϵ ′ dµ = 0. Now any choice of S leads to another configu-
ration (a′,b ′, 0) with b ′ = f (a′). 
This entails the following lemma, which will enable us to use approximants on the final probabilis-
tic transition system F as uniform approximants across all models:
Lemma 4.15. Let ϕ and ψ be bisimulation-invariant first-order properties. Then, for any model A,
‖ϕ −ψ ‖A∞ ≤ ‖ϕ −ψ ‖
F
∞ .
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Proof. Let A be a model, and let h : A → F be the unique morphism. Let a ∈ A. Then
dG (a,h(a)) = 0 by Lemma 4.14, and thus ϕA(a) = ϕF(h(a)) and ψA(a) = ψF(h(a)) by bisimu-
lation invariance. So
‖ϕ −ψ ‖A∞ = sup
a∈A
|ϕA(a) −ψA(a)| = sup
a∈A
|ϕF(h(a)) −ψF(h(a))| ≤ ‖ϕ −ψ ‖
F
∞ . 
5 LOCALITY
As indicated in the introduction, the proof of our van Benthem theorem now proceeds by first
establishing that every bisimulation-invariant first-order formula ϕ is local in a sense to be made
precise shortly, and subsequently that ϕ is in fact even finite-depth bisimulation invariant, for a
depth that is exponential in the rank of ϕ. The announced notion of locality makes reference to a
notion of Gaifman graph [16] and distance that we adapt to the probabilistic setting:
Definition 5.1. Let A be a probabilistic transition system.
(1) The Gaifman graph of A is the undirected graph on the set A of vertices that has an edge
for every pair (a,a′) with π (a,a′) > 0.
(2) The Gaifman distance D : A × A → N ∪ {∞} is graph distance in the Gaifman graph: for
every a,a′ ∈ A, the distance D(a,a′) is the least number of edges on a path from a to a′, if
at least one such path exists, and∞ otherwise.
(3) For a ∈ A and k ≥ 0, the radius k neighbourhood of a inA, denoted byU k (a), is the subset of
A that is reachable in at most k steps: U k (a) = {a′ ∈ A | D(a,a′) ≤ k}. For a¯ = (a1, . . . ,an)
we put U k (a¯) =
⋃
i≤nU
k (ai ).
Given a state a in a probabilistic transition system A and a radius k , we can now restrict A to a
smaller set of states by discarding all states at a distance greater than k from a. States at distance
k become terminating. Formally:
Definition 5.2. Let A be a model, a ∈ A and k ≥ 0. The restriction of A to U k (a) is the model
Aka with setU
k (a) of states, and
pA
k
a (b) = pA(b)
πA
k
a (b, c) =
{
πA(b, c), if D(a,b) < k,
0, if D(a,b) = k,
for all p ∈ At and b, c ∈ U k (a). Note that this does actually define a probabilistic transition system,
because if D(a,b) < k , then D(a, c) ≤ k for all c with πA(b, c) > 0.
These restricted models have the expected relationship with games of bounded depth:
Lemma 5.3. Let a be a state in a probabilistic transition system A. Then D wins the k-round 0-
bisimulation game forA,a and Aka ,a.
Proof. Player D wins by maintaining the invariant that whenever i rounds have been played,
the current configuration is of the form (ai ,ai , 0) for some ai ∈ A with D(a,ai ) ≤ i . For i < k ,
no configuration of this kind can be winning for S , because the two states in this configuration
represent the same state in different models (recall that the winning conditions are not checked
after the last round has been played).
It remains to give a strategy for D that maintains the invariant. It clearly holds at the start
of the game, with a0 = a. When the (i + 1)-th round is played, D can pick µ ∈ πai ⊗ πai and
18
ϵ ′ : A ×U k (a) → [0, 1] as follows:
µ(a′,a′′) =
{
πai (a
′), if a′ = a′′,
0, otherwise,
ϵ ′(a′,a′′) = 0.
Clearly,
∫
ϵ ′ dµ = 0, so this is a legal move. Now the new configuration chosen by S necessarily
satisfies the invariant. 
Locality of a formula now means that its truth values only ever depend on the neighbourhood of
the state in question:
Definition 5.4. A formula ϕ(x) is k-local for some radius k , if for every modelA and every state
a ∈ A, ϕA(a) = ϕAka (a).
Since modal formulas are bisimulation-invariant, Lemma 5.3 implies
Lemma 5.5. Every quantitative probabilistic modal formula of rank at most k is k-local.
To prove locality of bisimulation-invariant first-order formulas, we require a model-theoretic tool,
an adaptation of Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé equivalence to the probabilistic setting:
Definition 5.6. LetA,B be probabilistic transition systems, and let a¯0 and b¯0 be vectors of equal
length over A and B, respectively. The Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game for A, a¯0 and B, b¯0, played by S
(spoiler) and D (duplicator), is given as follows.
• Configurations: pairs (a¯, b¯) of vectors a¯ over A and b¯ over B.
• Initial configuration: (a¯0, b¯0).
• Moves: Each round can be played in one of two ways, chosen by S :
– Standard round: S may select a state in one model, say a ∈ A, and D then has to select a
state in the other model, say b ∈ B, reaching the configuration (a¯a, b¯b).
– Probabilistic round: S may select an index i and a fuzzy subset in one of the models, say
ϕA : A→ [0, 1].D then needs to select a fuzzy subset in the othermodel, sayϕB : B → [0, 1],
such that
∫
ϕA dπai =
∫
ϕB dπbi . Then, S selects an element on one of the sides, say a ∈ A,
such that π (ai ,a) > 0, and D then selects an element on the other side, say b ∈ B, such
that ϕA(a) = ϕB(b) and π (bi ,b) > 0, reaching the configuration (a¯a, b¯b).
• Winning conditions: Any player who cannot move loses. S wins if a configuration is reached
(including the initial configuration) that fails to be a partial isomorphism. Here, a configura-
tion (a¯, b¯) is a partial isomorphism if
– ai = aj ⇐⇒ bi = bj
– p(ai ) = p(bi ) for all i and all p ∈ At
– πai (aj ) = πbi (bj ) for all i, j .
D wins if she reaches the n-th round (maintaining configurations that are not winning for
S).
As indicated in the related work section, our probabilistic version of the game is partly modelled on
games for topological first-order logic [28], the main difference being that in probabilistic rounds,
we let the players select fuzzy instead of crisp subsets. (Similarly, in Desharnais et al.’s probabilistic
bisimulation games [12], the probabilistic rounds involve crisp subsets.) For our purposes, we need
only soundness of Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé equivalence:
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Lemma 5.7 (Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé invariance). LetA,B be probabilistic transition systems, and let
a¯0, b¯0 be vectors of lengthm over A and B, respectively. Suppose that D wins the n-round Ehrenfeucht-
Fraïssé game on a¯0, b¯0. Then, for every probabilistic first-order formulaϕ with at mostm free variables
x1, . . . , xm and qr(ϕ) ≤ n,
ϕ(a¯0) = ϕ(b¯0).
Proof. We proceed by induction over formulas.
• The cases p(xi ) and xi = x j (with p ∈ At) follow immediately from the fact that the initial
configuration is a partial isomorphism.
• The Boolean cases (c,ϕ ⊖ c,¬ϕ,ϕ ∧ψ ) follow directly by the induction hypothesis.
• ∃x .ϕ: Let (a¯, b¯) be the current configuration. Let δ > 0, let a be such that
(∃x .ϕ)(a¯) − ϕ(a¯a) < δ ,
and let b be the winning answer for D in reply to S choosing a. By induction, ϕ(a¯a) = ϕ(b¯b),
so
(∃x .ϕ)(b¯) ≥ ϕ(b¯b) = ϕ(a¯a) > (∃x .ϕ)(a¯) − δ .
Because δ > 0 was arbitrary, it follows that (∃x .ϕ)(b¯) ≥ (∃x .ϕ)(a¯). We can symmetrically
show that (∃x .ϕ)(a¯) ≥ (∃x .ϕ)(b¯), which proves this case.
• xi^⌈ym+1 : ϕ⌉: Let (a¯, b¯) be the current configuration. Suppose that S picks the index i and
the fuzzy subset
ϕA : A→ [0, 1], a 7→ ϕA(a¯a)
and D’s winning reply is ψB : B → [0, 1]. We show that on the support of πbi , ψB must be
equal to
ϕB : B → [0, 1], b 7→ ϕB(b¯b).
Suppose there exists some b ∈ B with π (bi ,b) > 0 and ϕB(b) , ψB (b). Then D has a winning
reply a ∈ A in case S picks this b, which means, by the rules of the game, that π (ai ,a) > 0
and ϕA(a) = ψB (b). However, it is also true that ϕA(a) = ϕB(b), by the induction hypothesis.
This is a contradiction.
Now, becauseψB was a winning reply, we obtain
(xi^⌈xm+1 : ϕ⌉)(a¯) =
∫
ϕA dπai =
∫
ψB dπbi =
∫
ϕB dπbi = (xi^⌈xm+1 : ϕ⌉)(b¯). 
Since embeddings into disjoint unions of models are morphisms, the following is immediate from
Lemma 4.14:
Lemma 5.8. Every bisimulation-invariant formula is also invariant under disjoint union.
We have now assembled the necessary ingredients to prove our desired locality result:
Lemma 5.9 (Locality). Let ϕ be a bisimulation invariant first-order formula of quantifier rank n
with one free variable. Then ϕ is k-local for k = 3n .
Proof. Let a be a state in a probabilistic transition systemA. We need to show ϕA(a) = ϕAka (a).
Let B be a new model that extendsA by adding n disjoint copies of bothA andAka . Let C be the
model that extendsAka likewise. We finish the proof by showing that
ϕA(a) = ϕB(a) = ϕC(a) = ϕAka (a).
The first and third equality follow by bisimulation invariance of ϕ (Lemma 5.8). The second equal-
ity follows by Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé invariance (Lemma 5.7) once we show that D has a winning
strategy in the n-round Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game for B,a and C,a.
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Such a winning strategy can be described as follows: D maintains the invariant that, if the
configuration reached after i rounds is (b¯, c¯), then there exists an isomorphism fi between U
ki (b¯)
and U ki (c¯) that maps each bj to the corresponding c j , where ki = 3
n−i .
The invariant holds at the start of the game, because the neighbourhoods on both sides are just
U k (a). Similarly, whenever the invariant holds, the current configuration is a partial isomorphism
by restriction of the given isomorphism to the two vectors of the configuration.
Now we consider what happens during the rounds. Suppose that i rounds have been played,
and the current configuration is (b¯, c¯). If S decides to play a standard round, playing some b ∈ B,
then there are two cases:
• b ∈ U 2ki+1 (b¯): In this case, the radius-ki+1 neighbourhoodU
ki+1 (b) of b is fully contained in
the domain U ki (b¯) of fi – this follows by the triangle inequality, as 2ki+1 + ki+1 = 3ki+1 =
ki . Now D can just reply with c := fi (b), and an isomorphism fi+1 between U
ki+1 (b¯b) and
U ki+1 (c¯c) is formed by restricting the domain and codomain of fi appropriately.
• b < U 2ki+1 (b¯): In this case, the radius-ki+1 neighbourhoods U
ki+1 (b) of b and U ki+1 (b¯) of b¯
do not intersect – this too follows from the triangle inequality. Now D can pick a fresh
copy of A or Aka in C (depending on which kind of copy b lies in); her reply c is then
just b in that copy. Here, a fresh copy is one that was never visited on any of the previous
rounds. By construction of B and C, such a copy is always available. This means that we
now have two isomorphisms, one between U ki+1 (b¯) and U ki+1(c¯) (by restriction of fi ), and
one between U ki+1 (b) and U ki+1 (c) (by isomorphism of the respective copies of A or Aka ).
Because these isomorphisms have disjoint domains and codomains, we can combine them
to form the desired isomorphism fi+1.
If S plays a standard round with some c ∈ C instead, the same argument applies.
Finally, if S starts a probabilistic round by picking an index 0 ≤ j ≤ i and playing some ϕB : B →
[0, 1], then we first note that, by the rules of the game, the support of ϕB must be contained in
U 1(b¯), which in turn must be contained in the domain of fi . This means that D can construct
ϕC : C → [0, 1] by mapping along fi , i.e. ϕC (c) = ϕB(f
−1
i (c)) for all successors c of c j , and ϕC (c) = 0
otherwise. Now, whichever b or c is picked by S , D can just reply with c := fi (b) or b := f
−1
i (c)
and fi+1 is formed as in the first case of a standard round. Again, the same argument applies if S
picks a fuzzy subset ϕC on the other side. 
6 A PROBABILISTIC VAN BENTHEM THEOREM
Having established locality of bisimulation-invariant first-order formulas and modal approxima-
bility of finite-depth bisimulation-invariant properties, we now discharge the last remaining steps
in our programme: We show by means of an unravelling construction that bisimulation-invariant
first-order formulas are already finite-depth bisimulation-invariant, and then conclude our main
result, the probabilistic van Benthem theorem.
Definition 6.1. Let A be a probabilistic transition system. The unravelling A∗ of A is a prob-
abilistic transition system with non-empty finite sequences a¯ ∈ A+ as states, where atoms and
transition probabilities are defined as follows:
pA
∗
(a¯) = pA(last(a¯))
πA
∗
(a¯, a¯a) = πA(last(a¯),a),
for any a¯ ∈ A+ and a ∈ A, where last(a¯) is the last element of a¯.
As usual, models are bisimilar to their unravellings:
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Lemma 6.2. For any probabilistic transition system A and a ∈ A, D has a winning strategy in the
0-bisimulation game for A,a andA∗,a.
Proof. D wins by maintaining the invariant that the configuration of the game is of the form
(a¯, last(a¯), 0) for some a¯ ∈ A+. To do so, she can put µ(a¯a,a) = πa¯(a¯a) = πlast(a¯)(a) for all a ∈ A
+,
all other values of µ are 0, and ϵ ′ = 0. Then any move by S leads to a configuration where the
invariant holds. 
We next show that locality and bisimulation invariance imply finite-depth bisimulation invariance:
Lemma 6.3. Let ϕ be bisimulation invariant and k-local. Then ϕ is depth-k bisimulation invariant.
Proof. Let A and B be two probabilistic transition systems and let a ∈ A and b ∈ B be two
states such that dG
k
(a,b) < ϵ . It is enough to show that |ϕA(a) − ϕB(b)| ≤ ϵ .
We denote by a′ anda′′ the copies of a inA∗ and (A∗)ka , respectively. Similarly,b
′ andb ′′ denote
the copies ofb in B∗ and (B∗)k
b
. By Lemma 6.2,D wins the 0-bisimulation-game forA,a andA∗,a′
(similarly for B) and by Lemma 5.3, she also wins the k-round 0-bisimulation game forA∗,a′ and
(A∗)ka ,a
′′ (similarly for B). Because behavioural distance dG
k
is a pseudometric, this means that
dGk (a
′′
,b ′′) ≤ dGk (a
′′
,a′) + dGk (a
′
,a) + dGk (a,b) + d
G
k (b,b
′) + dGk (b
′
,b ′′) = dGk (a,b) < ϵ,
so D has a winning strategy in the k-round ϵ-bisimulation game for (A∗)ka ,a
′′ and (B∗)k
b
,b ′′.
In both (A∗)ka ,a
′′ and (B∗)k
b
,b ′′, the reachable states form a tree of depth at most k . This implies
that, after i rounds of the game, the two states on either side of the current configuration are nodes
at distance i from the root of their respective tree. Thus, whenever k rounds have been played in
the game, S does not have a legal move in the next round, because at that point, both nodes in
the configuration are necessarily leaves and thus terminating. This in turn means that if D can
win the k-round game, she also wins the unbounded game, so, by bisimulation invariance of ϕ,
|ϕ(A∗)ka (a
′′) − ϕ(B∗)k
b
(b ′′)| ≤ ϵ .
By locality and bisimulation invariance of ϕ, and again Lemma 6.2, we have ϕ(A∗)ka (a
′′) =
ϕA∗(a
′) = ϕA(a) as well asϕ(B∗)k
b
(b ′′) = ϕB∗(b
′) = ϕB(b). Thus |ϕA(a)−ϕB(b)| ≤ ϵ , as claimed. 
Our main result is then stated as follows:
Theorem 6.4 (Probabilistic van Benthem theorem). Every bisimulation-invariant formula of prob-
abilistic first order logic with rank at most n can be approximated (uniformly across all models) by
probabilistic modal formulas of rank at most 3n .
Proof. Let ϕ be a probabilistic first-order formula of rank n. By Lemma 5.9 and Lemma 6.3,
ϕ is depth-k bisimulation-invariant for k = 3n . By Theorem 4.2, for every ϵ > 0, there exists a
probabilistic modal formula ψϵ of rank at most k such that ‖ϕ −ψϵ ‖∞ ≤ ϵ on the final coalgebra
F . By Lemma 4.15, this approximation is uniform. 
Remark 6.5. Although it is easy to adapt the unravelling construction to preserve finite models
by using partial unravelling up to the locality depth, this will still not yield a Rosen version of the
above theorem, i.e. one where the semantics is restricted to finite models. The reason is that the
proof as given above involves the final probabilistic transition system, which is infinite. We thus
leave the proof (or refutation) of such a finite-model version of the theorem as an open problem.
Remark 6.6. Asmentioned in Section 2, a version of the characterization theorem for unrestricted
subdistributions (i.e. where the possible models are coalgebras for the functor [0, 1]At ×D(1+ id))
can be recovered with some technical adaptations. This mostly concerns the Wasserstein-based
distance as well as the bisimulation game, as the notion of couplings (Definition 3.3) needs to be
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changed. A coupling of two subdistributions π1 on A and π2 on B is a probability distribution on
(1+A) × (1+B). The Wasserstein distance of π1 and π2 for some pseudometric d is then defined as
d↓(πa , πb ) =
∧
µ ∈πa ⊗πb
∫
d¯ dµ , using the construction d¯ from Remark 3.2. As for the changes in the
game, D now needs to pick a coupling of subdistributions as just defined and when distributing
the deviation ϵ over the successor pairs, she needs to pick ϵ ′ : (1 + A) × (1 + B) → [0, 1] with the
restriction that ϵ ′(a′, ∗) = ϵ ′(∗,b ′) = 1 for all a′ ∈ A and b ′ ∈ B.
7 CONCLUSIONS
We established a modal characterization result for quantitative probabilistic modal logic, which
states that every formula of quantitative probabilistic first-order logic that is bisimulation-
invariant, i.e. non-expansive w.r.t. a natural notion of behavioural distance on probabilistic tran-
sition systems, can be approximated by modal formulas of bounded modal rank, the bound being
exponential in the rank of the original formula. As discussed in the introduction, the bound on the
modal rank is the crucial feature of this result. Put differently, on bisimulation-invariant proper-
ties, quantitative probabilistic modal logic is as expressive as quantitative probabilistic first-order
logic, up to approximation in bounded rank.
We leave several obvious open problems, the most prominent one being whether ourmain result
can be sharpened to state actual equivalence of a given bisimulation-invariant first-order formula
to a modal formula rather than only approximability. (Wild et al. leave a similar open problem for
the case of fuzzy modal logic [45].) Moreover, we have already mentioned in Remark 6.5 that the
version of our main result that restricts the semantics to finite models, in analogy to Rosen’s finite-
model version of van Benthem’s theorem [31], remains open. Further directions for future research
include lifting our methods and results to a coalgebraic level of generality building on existing
work on coalgebraic behavioural pseudometrics [23] (for the quantitative setting; the crisp case has
already been established [33, 27, 34]), thus covering, e.g., semiring weighted systems or weighted
alternating-time logics; a treatment of Łukasiewicz semantics of the propositional connectives;
and a characterization theorem for the probabilistic µ-calculus providing a quantitative version of
the Janin-Wałukiewicz theorem [22], which would characterize the probabilistic µ-calculus within
a suitable quantitative probabilistic monadic second-order logic.
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